

## Colo. R. Prof'l. Cond. 1.5

### Rule 1.5 - Fees

**(a)** A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

- (1)** the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2)** the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3)** the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
- (4)** the amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5)** the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6)** the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7)** the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
- (8)** whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

**(b)** When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee and expenses shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be promptly communicated to the client, in writing.

**(c)** A contingent fee" is a fee for legal services under which compensation is to be contingent in whole or in part upon the successful accomplishment or disposition of the subject matter of the representation.

- (1)** The terms of a contingent fee agreement shall be communicated in writing before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation and shall include the following information:
  - (i)** The names of the lawyer and the client;
  - (ii)** A statement of the nature of the claim, controversy or other matters with reference to which the services are to be performed, including each event triggering the lawyer's right to compensation;
  - (iii)** The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or amounts that will accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, or other final disposition, and whether the contingent fee will be determined before or after the deduction of (A) costs and expenses advanced by the lawyer or otherwise incurred by the client, and (B) other amounts owed by the client and payable from amounts recovered;
  - (iv)** A statement of the circumstances under which the lawyer may be entitled to compensation if the lawyer's representation concludes, by discharge, withdrawal or otherwise, before the occurrence of an event that triggers the lawyer's right to a contingent fee;
  - (v)** A statement regarding expenses, including (A) an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, (B) whether the lawyer is authorized to advance funds for litigation-related expenses to be reimbursed to the lawyer



from the recovery, and, if so, the amount of expenses the lawyer may advance without further approval, and (C) the client's obligation, if any, to pay expenses if there is no recovery;

(vi) A statement regarding the possibility that a court will award costs or attorney fees against the client;

(vii) A statement regarding the possibility that a court will award costs or attorney fees in favor of the client, and, if so, how any such costs or attorney fees will be accounted for and handled;

(viii) A statement informing the client that if the lawyer wishes to hire a lawyer in another firm to assist in the handling of a matter ("associated counsel"), the lawyer will promptly inform the client in writing of the identity of the associated counsel, and that (A) the hiring of associated counsel will not increase the contingent fee, unless the client otherwise agrees in writing, and (B) the client has the right to disapprove the hiring of associated counsel and, if hired, to terminate the employment of associated counsel; and

(ix) A statement that other persons or entities may have a right to be paid from amounts recovered on the client's behalf, for example when an insurer or a federal or state agency has paid money or benefits on behalf of a client in connection with the subject of the representation.

(2) A contingent fee agreement must be signed by the client and the lawyer.

(3) The lawyer shall retain a copy of the contingent fee agreement for seven years after the final resolution of the case, or the termination of the lawyer's services, whichever first occurs.

(4) No contingent fee agreement may be made

(i) for representing a defendant in a criminal case,

(ii) in a domestic relations matter, where payment is contingent on the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of maintenance or child support, or property settlement in lieu of such amounts, or

(iii) in connection with any case or proceeding where a contingency method of a determination of attorney fees is otherwise prohibited by law.

(5) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client a written disbursement statement showing the amount or amounts received, an itemization of costs and expenses incurred in handling of the matter, sums to be disbursed to third parties, including lawyers in other law firms, and computation of the contingent fee.

(6) No contingent fee agreement shall be enforceable unless the lawyer has substantially complied with all of the provisions of this Rule.

(7) The form Contingent Fee Agreement following the comment to this Rule may be used for contingent fee agreements and shall be sufficient to comply with paragraph (c)(1) of this Rule. The authorization of this form shall not prevent the use of other forms consistent with this Rule. Nothing in this Rule prevents a lawyer from entering into an agreement that provides for a contingent fee combined with one or more other types of fees, such as hourly or flat fees, provided that the agreement complies with this Rule insofar as the contingent fee is concerned.

(d) Other than in connection with the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17, a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;



**(2)** the client agrees to the arrangement, including the basis upon which the division of fees shall be made, and the client's agreement is confirmed in writing; and

**(3)** the total fee is reasonable.

**(e)** Referral fees are prohibited.

**(f)** Fees are not earned until the lawyer confers a benefit on the client or performs a legal service for the client. Advances of unearned fees are the property of the client and shall be deposited in the lawyer's trust account pursuant to Rule 1.15B(a)(1) until earned. If advances of unearned fees are in the form of property other than funds, then the lawyer shall hold such property separate from the lawyer's own property pursuant to Rule 1.15A(a).

**(g)** Nonrefundable fees and nonrefundable retainers are prohibited. Any agreement that purports to restrict a client's right to terminate the representation, or that unreasonably restricts a client's right to obtain a refund of unearned or unreasonable fees, is prohibited.

**(h)** A "flat fee" is a fee for specified legal services for which the client agrees to pay a fixed amount, regardless of the time or effort involved.

**(1)** The terms of a flat fee shall be communicated in writing before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation and shall include the following information:

**(i)** A description of the services the lawyer agrees to perform;

**(ii)** The amount to be paid to the lawyer and the timing of payment for the services to be performed;

**(iii)** If any portion of the flat fee is to be earned by the lawyer before conclusion of the representation, the amount to be earned upon the completion of specified tasks or the occurrence of specified events; and

**(iv)** The amount or the method of calculating the fees the lawyer earns, if any, should the representation terminate before completion of the specified tasks or the occurrence of specified events.

**(2)** If all or any portion of a flat fee is paid in advance of being earned and a dispute arises about whether the lawyer has earned all or part of the flat fee, the lawyer shall comply with Rule 1.15A(c) with respect to any portion of the flat fee that is in dispute.

**(3)** The form Flat Fee Agreement following the comment to this Rule may be used for flat fee agreements and shall be sufficient. The authorization of this form shall not prevent the use of other forms consistent with this Rule.

*RPC 1.5*

(b) and Comment amended April 20, 2000, effective July 1, 2000; (d) amended and adopted April 18, 2001, effective July 1, 2001; entire rule and Comment amended and adopted May 30, 2002, effective July 1, 2002; entire Appendix repealed and readopted April 12, 2007, effective January 1, 2008; Comment [7] amended and effective November 6, 2008; (b) amended and Comment [3A] repealed March 10, 2011, effective July 1, 2011; (f) amended effective April 6, 2016; amended and adopted January 31, 2019, effective January 31, 2019; amended and adopted October 1, 2020, effective January 1, 2021.

**COMMENT** *Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses*

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses



*incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.*

#### *Basis or Rate of Fee*

*[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible, but when there has been a change from their previous understanding the basis or rate of the fee should be promptly communicated in writing. In a new client-lawyer relationship, the basis or rate of the fee must be promptly communicated in writing to the client, but the communication need not take the form of a formal engagement letter or agreement, and it need not be signed by the client. Moreover, it is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee, or to furnish the client with a simple memorandum or the lawyer's customary fee schedule. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier communication substantially inaccurate, a revised written communication should be provided to the client. All flat fee arrangements must be in writing and must comply with paragraph (h) of this Rule. All contingent fee arrangements must be in writing, regardless of whether the client-lawyer relationship is new or established. See C.R.C.P., Ch. 23.3, Rule 1.*

*[3] Repealed.*

*[3A] Repealed.*

#### *Terms of Payment*

*[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.*

*[5] A fee agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.*

*[6] Contingent fees, whether based on the recovery or savings of money, or on a nonmonetary outcome, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (limiting percentage of fees in Federal Tort Claims Act cases); C.R.S. § 8-43-403 (limiting percentage of contingent fee in certain worker's compensation cases). The prohibition on contingent fees in certain domestic relations matters does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, maintenance or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.*

*[6A] The scope of representation in a contingent fee agreement should reflect whether the representation includes the handling of counterclaims, third-party claims to amounts recovered, and appeals.*

*[6B] A lawyer may include a provision in a contingent fee agreement setting forth the lawyer's agreement to reimburse the client for any attorney fees and costs awarded against the client. A provision in a contingent fee agreement in which the client must reimburse the lawyer for any attorney fees or costs awarded against the lawyer may be improper.*



[6C] *Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from arranging, in the contingent fee agreement or otherwise, for a third party to guarantee some or all of the financial obligations of the client in the contingent fee agreement.*

[6D] *Third parties often hold claims to amounts recovered by the lawyer on behalf of the client. The lawyer may be required, as a matter of professional ethics, to pay these amounts from the proceeds of a recovery and not to disburse them to the client.*

[6E] *A tribunal may award attorney fees to the client under a fee-shifting provision of a contract or statute or as a sanction for discovery violations or other litigation misconduct. The fee agreement may provide for a different allocation of such an award of fees as between the client and the lawyer depending on the circumstances giving rise to the award, such as whether the fees are awarded as a sanction for improper conduct that necessitated additional effort by the lawyer, or whether the fees are awarded under a contractual or statutory fee-shifting provision. This rule does not limit the ways in which clients and lawyers may contract to allocate awards of attorney fees; however, the lawyer must comply with the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule.*

[6F] *A conversion clause is a provision in a contingent fee agreement that notifies clients they may be liable for attorney fees in quantum meruit or on another alternate basis if the contingent fee agreement is terminated before the occurrence of the contingency. See, form Contingent Fee Agreement, ¶ (4). A conversion clause that requires payment of the alternate fee immediately upon termination, and regardless of the occurrence of the contingency, would discourage most clients from discharging their lawyer. Few clients have the financial means to pay a contingent fee from their own resources, with no guarantee of replenishment by a recovery from a third party. Therefore, a conversion clause that requires payment of the alternate fee immediately upon termination may be appropriate only if (a) the client is sophisticated in legal matters, has the means to pay the fee regardless of the occurrence of the contingency, and has specifically negotiated the conversion clause; and (b) the contingent fee agreement expressly requires payment of the alternate fee immediately upon termination.*

#### *Division of Fee*

[7] *A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (d) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should refer a matter only to a lawyer who the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.*

[8] *Paragraph (d) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.*

#### *Disputes over Fees*

[9] *If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.*

#### *Advances of Unearned Fees and Engagement Retainer Fees*

[10] *The analysis of when a lawyer may treat advances of unearned fees as property of the lawyer must begin with the principle that the lawyer must hold in trust all fees paid by the client until there is a basis on which to conclude that the lawyer has earned the fee; otherwise the funds must remain in the lawyer's trust account because they are not the lawyer's property.*



[11] To make a determination of when an advance fee is earned, the written statement of the basis or rate of the fee, when required by Rule 1.5(b) or (h), should include a description of the benefit or service that justifies the lawyer's earning the fee, the amount of the advance unearned fee, as well as a statement describing when the fee is earned. Whether a lawyer has conferred a sufficient benefit to earn a portion of the advance fee will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. The circumstances under which a fee is earned should be evaluated under an objective standard of reasonableness. Rule 1.5(a).

[12] Advances of unearned fees, including advances of all or a portion of a flat fee, are those funds the client pays for specified legal services that the lawyer has agreed to perform in the future. Pursuant to Rule 1.5(f), the lawyer must deposit an advance of unearned fees in the lawyer's trust account. The funds may be earned only as the lawyer performs specified legal services or confers benefits on the client as provided for in the written statement of the basis of the fee, if a written statement is required by Rule 1.5(b). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 34, 38 (1998). Rule 1.5(f) does not prevent a lawyer from entering into these types of arrangements.

[13] For example, the lawyer and client may agree that portions of the advance of unearned fees are deemed earned at the lawyer's hourly rate and become the lawyer's property as and when the lawyer provides legal services.

[14] A lawyer and client may agree that a flat fee or a portion of a flat fee is earned in various ways. For example, the lawyer and client may agree to an advance flat fee that will be earned in whole or in part based upon the lawyer's completion of specific tasks or the occurrence of specific events, regardless of the precise amount of the lawyer's time involved. For instance, in a criminal defense matter, a lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer earns portions of the flat fee upon the lawyer's entry of appearance, initial advisement, review of discovery, preliminary hearing, pretrial conference, disposition hearing, motions hearing, trial, and sentencing. Similarly, in a trusts and estates matter, a lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer earns portions of the flat fee upon client consultation, legal research, completing the initial draft of testamentary documents, further client consultation, and completing the final documents.

[15] The portions of the advance flat fee earned as each such event occurs need not be in equal amounts. However, the fees attributed to each event should reflect a reasonable estimate of the proportionate value of the legal services the lawyer provides in completing each designated event to the anticipated legal services to be provided on the entire matter. See Rule 1.5(a); Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244 1252-53 (Colo. 1996) (client's sophistication is relevant factor).

[16] "[A]n 'engagement retainer fee' is a fee paid, apart from any other compensation, to ensure that a lawyer will be available for the client if required. An engagement retainer must be distinguished from a lump-sum fee [i.e., a flat fee] constituting the entire payment for a lawyer's service in a matter and from an advance payment from which fees will be subtracted (see § 38, Comment g). A fee is an engagement retainer only if the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for actual work, if any, performed." Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 34 Comment e. An engagement retainer fee agreement must comply with Rule 1.5(a), (b), and (g), and should expressly include the amount of the engagement retainer fee, describe the service or benefit that justifies the lawyer's earning the engagement retainer fee, and state that the engagement retainer fee is earned upon receipt. As defined above, an engagement retainer fee will be earned upon receipt because the lawyer provides an immediate benefit to the client, such as forgoing other business opportunities by making the lawyer's services available for a given period of time to the exclusion of other clients or potential clients, or by giving priority to the client's work over other matters.

[17] Because an engagement retainer fee is earned at the time it is received, it must not be commingled with client property. However, it may be subject to refund to the client in the event of changed circumstances.

[18] It is unethical for a lawyer to fail to return unearned fees, to charge an excessive fee, or to characterize any lawyer's fee as nonrefundable. Lawyer's fees are always subject to refund if either excessive or unearned. If all or some portion of a lawyer's fee becomes subject to refund, then the amount to be refunded should be paid directly to the client if there is no further legal work to be performed or if the lawyer's employment is terminated. In the alternative, if there is an ongoing client-lawyer relationship and there is further work to be done, it may be deposited in the lawyer's trust account, to be withdrawn from the trust account as it is earned.

[Link to PDF of Form Flat Fee Agreement](#)

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**Form Flat Fee Agreement**



**I. Legal Services to Be Performed.**

In exchange for the fee described in this Agreement, Lawyer will perform the following legal services ("Services"): [Insert specific description of the scope and/or objective of the representation. Examples: Represent Client in DUI criminal case in Jefferson County; Prepare a Will [or Power of Attorney or contract]]

**II. Flat Fee.**

This is a flat fee agreement. Client will pay Lawyer [or Firm] \$ \_\_\_\_\_ for Lawyer's [or Firm's] performance of the Services described in Section I, above, plus costs as described in Section VI, below. Client understands that Client is NOT entering into an hourly fee arrangement. This means that Lawyer [or Firm] will devote such time to the representation as is necessary, but the Lawyer's [or Firm's] fee will not be increased or decreased based upon the number of hours spent.

**III. When Fee Is Earned.**

The flat fee will be earned in increments, as follows:

Description of increment: \_\_\_\_\_ Amount earned: \_\_\_\_\_

[Alternatively: The flat fee will be earned when Lawyer [or Firm] provides Client with [Select one: the Will, the Power of Attorney, the contract, other specified description of work].

**IV. When Fee Is Payable.**

Client shall pay Lawyer [or Firm] [Select one: in advance, as billed, or as the services are completed]. Fees paid in advance shall be placed in Lawyer's [or Firm's] trust account and shall remain the property of Client until they are earned. When the fee or part of the fee is earned pursuant to this Agreement, it becomes the property of Lawyer [or Firm].

**V. Right to Terminate Representation and Fees on Termination.**

Client has the right to terminate the representation at any time and for any reason, and Lawyer [or firm] may terminate the representation in accordance with Rule 1.16 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. In the event that Client terminates the representation without wrongful conduct by Lawyer [or Firm] that would cause Lawyer [or Firm] to forfeit any fee, or Lawyer [or Firm] justifiably withdraws in accordance with Rule 1.16 from representing Client, Client shall pay, and Lawyer [or Firm] shall be entitled to, the fee or part of the fee earned by Lawyer [or Firm] as described in Section I, above, up to the time of termination. In a litigation matter, Client shall pay, and Lawye [or Firm] shall be entitled to, the fee or part of the fee earned up to the time when the court grants Lawyer's motion for withdrawal. If the representation is terminated between the completion of increments described in Section III above, Client shall pay a fee based on [an hourly rate of \$ \_\_\_\_\_] [the percentage of the task completed] [other specified method]. However, such fees shall not exceed the amount that would have been earned had the representation continued until the completion of the increment, and in any event all fees shall be reasonable.

**VI. Costs.**

Client is liable to Lawyer [or Firm] for reasonable expenses and disbursements. Examples of such expenses and disbursements are fees payable to the Court and expenses involved in preparing exhibits. Such expenses and disbursements are estimated to be \$ \_\_\_\_\_. Client authorizes Lawyer [or Firm] to incur expenses and disbursements up to a maximum of \$ \_\_\_\_\_, which limitation will not be exceeded without Client's further written authorization. Client shall reimburse Lawyer for such expenditures [Select one: upon receipt of a billing, in specified installments, or upon completion of the Services].



Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

CLIENT:

ATTORNEY [FIRM]:

Signature

Signature

*ANNOTATION Law reviews. For article, "Confirm Attorney Fees in Writing: Court Changes Colo. RPC 1.4, 1.5", see 29 Colo. Law. 27 (June 2000). For article, "Fee Agreements: Types, Provisions, Ethical Boundaries, and Other Considerations-Part I", see 31 Colo. Law. 35 (March 2002). For article, "Fee Agreements: Types, Provisions, Ethical Boundaries, and Other Considerations-Part II", see 31 Colo. Law. 35 (April 2002). For article, "Enforcing Civility: The Rules of Professional Conduct in Deposition Settings", see 33 Colo. Law. 75 (March 2004). For article, "The Duty of Loyalty and Preparations to Compete", see 34 Colo. Law. 67 (November 2005). For article, "Non-Monetary Compensation for Legal Services How Many Chickens Am I Worth?", see 35 Colo. Law. 95 (January 2006). For article, "The New Rules of Professional Conduct: Significant Changes for In-House Counsel", see 36 Colo. Law. 71 (November 2007). For article, "Ethics in Family Law and the New Rules of Professional Conduct", see 37 Colo. Law. 47 (October 2008). For article, "Midstream Fee and Expense Modifications Under the Colorado Ethics Rules", see 40 Colo. Law. 79 (August 2011). For article, "The Rules of Professional Conduct: An Equal Opportunity for Ethical Pitfalls", see 41 Colo. Law. 71 (October 2012). Annotator's note. Rule 1.5 is similar to Rule 1.5 as it existed prior to the 2007 repeal and readoption of the Colorado rules of professional conduct. Relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this rule. Supreme court is exclusive tribunal for regulation of the practice of law, including reasonableness of fees, notwithstanding statutory provision allowing the director of the division of workers' compensation to determine reasonableness of fees in a workers' compensation case. *In re Wimmershoff*, 3 P.3d 417 (Colo. 2000). Agreement for the division of fees between a firm and an attorney separating from the firm is valid an not against public policy. Where an attorney enters into a separation agreement with his or her firm upon departure and the agreement specifies the division of fees for clients continuing legal services with the departing attorney, the agreement is enforceable and does not implicate the policies behind this rule. *Norton Frickey, P.C. v. James B. Turner, P.C.*, 94 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2004). Further, clients benefit from separation agreements between a departing attorney and the firm because the client is not charged additional fees as a result of the agreement, nor is the client deceived or misled. *Norton Frickey, P.C. v. James B. Turner, P.C.*, 94 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2004). Charging client for costs of defending grievance proceeding violates DR 2-106(A) where charges are not unfounded and there is no prior agreement to pay such costs. *People v. Brown*, 840 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1992). Lawyer who billed client for the costs of defending a grievance violated this rule. There was no agreement between the attorney and the client to justify the billing, and the attorney's claim that the billing stemmed from the attorney's independent duty to protect the client was found by the grievance panel to be false. Therefore, the billing based on such a theory is deceptive and dishonest in violation of this rule. The appropriate sanction for the lawyer's conduct is public censure. *People v. Brown*, 840 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1992). Attorney's professional misconduct involving the improper collection of attorney's fees in six instances justified 45-day suspension. *People v. Peters*, 849 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1993). Lawyer's bills proper under this rule when lawyer billed attorney and secretarial services separately. *Newpor Pac. Capital Co. v. Waste*, 878 P.2d 136 (Colo. App. 1994). Relief in the nature of mandamus may be appropriate when it is alleged that a sheriff or chief of police has refused to accept applications for concealed weapons permits from private investigators who are not current or retired law enforcement officers and the sheriff or police chief has thereby breached a statutory duty to conduct a background check on each applicant. *Miller v. Collier*, 878 P.2d 141 (Colo. App. 1994). Public policy of protecting a client's right to control settlement will be better served by not treating a clause in a representation agreement that restricts the client's right to control settlement as severable from the provision for calculating fees. Where representation agreement provided alternate method of calculating the fees payable if the client unreasonably refused to settle, court refused to enforce either provision and allowed only reasonable value of services rendered by law firm. *Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer*, 903 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 926 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996). Stipulated agreement and recommendation of public censure with certain conditions and monitoring based upon conditional admission of misconduct were warranted for attorney who required that his associates sign a covenant that allowed his firm to collect 75 to 100 percent of the total fee generated by a case in which his firm did less than all the work. *People v. Wilson*, 953 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1998). Public censure and restitution were appropriate in case of attorney who unilaterally charged client \$1,000 in addition to previously agreed contingent fee. *In re Wimmershoff*, 3 P.3d 417 (Colo. 2000). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules, where mitigating factors were present, warrants public censure. *People v. Davis*, 950 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1998). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure. *In re Green*, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo. 2000). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. *People v. Crews*, 901 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1995); *People v. Hohertz*, 926 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1996); *People v. Sather*, 936 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Kotarek*, 941 P.2d 925 (Colo. 1997);*



*People v. Johnson*, 946 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1997). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. *People v. Jenks*, 910 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1996); *People v. Jamrozek*, 921 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1996); *People v. Sousa*, 943 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Clyne*, 945 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Roybal*, 949 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1997); *People v. Valley*, 960 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998); *People v. Tolentino*, 285 P.3d 340 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2012). Cases Decided Under Former DR 2-103. Law reviews. For article, "The Lawyer's Duty to Report Ethical Violations", see 18 Colo. Law. 1915 (1989). For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee on Collaboration with Non-Lawyers in the Preparation and Marketing of Estate Planning Documents, see 19 Colo. Law. 1793 (1990). Attorney's conduct in paying inmates for referrals to attorney for the provision of legal services justifies 60-day suspension. *People v. Shipp*, 793 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1990). Attorney's conduct in allowing company selling living trust packages to provide his name, exclusively, to customers upon sale, in conjunction with other violations and aggravating factors justifies six-month suspension. *People v. Cassidy*, 884 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1994). Cases Decided Under Former DR 2-106. Law reviews. For article, "Conflicts in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases", see 11 Colo. Law. 399 (1982). For article, "Attorney's Fees", see 11 Colo. Law. 411 (1982). For article, "Providing Legal Services for the Poor: A Dilemma and an Opportunity", see 11 Colo. Law. 666 (1982). For article, "Reduced Malpractice and Augmented Competency: A Proposal", see 12 Colo. Law. 1444 (1983). For article, "Ethical Problem Areas for Probate Lawyers", see 19 Colo. Law. 1069 (1990). For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee on Collaboration with Non-Lawyers in the Preparation and Marketing of Estate Planning Documents, see 19 Colo. Law. 1793 (1990). For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee on Recovery of Attorney Fee by Lender Using In-House Counsel, see 20 Colo. Law. 697 (1991). Where an attorney makes a uniform practice of imposing charges that exceed the statutory standards, such violates Canon 2. *People v. Radinsky*, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Attorney's charges for probate proceeding considere excessive on facts of case. *People ex rel. Goldberg v. Gordon*, 199 Colo. 296, 607 P.2d 995 (1980). Attorney who assessed excessive legal fees and attempted to retain improperly charged fees, neglected clients' interests to their detriment, and made misrepresentations as to services actually performed on clients' cases was properly suspended for thirty days. Although attorney previously found to have engaged in professional misconduct, attorney suffered personal tragedy prior to misconduct and subsequently improved by engaging in activities beneficial to legal and professional community. *People v. Brenner*, 764 P.2d 1178 (Colo. 1988). Where attorney enters into a fee arrangement basing his compensation directly on royalties his client might receive from oil and gas wells, it is clear that the arrangement is not intended as compensation for legal services provided and therefore constitutes conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. *People v. Nutt*, 696 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1984). Contingent fee agreement in a probate proceeding is not unconscionable or unreasonable where it was openly made and supported by adequate consideration. *In re Estate of Reid*, 680 P.2d 1305 (Colo. App. 1983). Excessive fees are basis for indefinite suspension of attorney. *People v. Radinsky*, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Contract held not to violate prohibition against maintenance. *Northland Ins. Co. v. Bashor*, 177 Colo. 463, 494 P.2d 1292 (1972). Evidence insufficient to establish excessive fee in violation of paragraph (A). *People v. Lanza*, 660 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1983). Suspended or disbarred attorney does not lose right to assert a claim for fees earned prior to suspension or disbarment. *Rutenbeck v. Grossenbach*, 867 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1993). Suspended attorney was entitled to collect one-third share of contingency fee under an agreement to divide the fee with two other attorneys where the agreement was based on a good faith division of services and responsibility at the time it was entered into. *Rutenbeck v. Grossenbach*, 867 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1993). Public censure warranted where attorney kept the first lump sum check obtained in settlement as a lump sum payment of his contingency fee and reimbursement of costs even though he knew the settlement might later be reduced by the social security disability award and the client's union award. *People v. Maceau*, 910 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1996). Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney billed for time that was not actually devoted to work contemplated by contract and for time not actually performed. *People v. Shields*, 905 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1995). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. *People v. Schmad*, 793 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1990); *People v. Sullivan*, 802 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1990); *People v. Dunsmoor*, 807 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1991); *People v. Koeberle*, 810 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1991); *People v. Kardokus*, 881 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1994); *People v. Johnson*, 881 P.2d 1205 (Colo. 1994); *People v. Banman*, 901 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1995); *People v. Dickinson*, 903 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995); *People v. Mills*, 923 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1996). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. *People v. Fleming*, 716 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1986). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. *People v. Dwyer*, 652 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982); *People v. Golden*, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982); *People v. Franks*, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990); *In re Bilderback*, 971 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1999). Applied in *Hartman v. Freedman*, 197 Colo. 275, 591 P.2d 1318 (1979); *People v. Meldahl*, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980); *People ex rel. Cortez v. Calvert*, 200 Colo. 157, 617 P.2d 797 (1980); *Mau v. E.P.H. Corp.*, 638 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1981); *Heller v. First Nat'l Bank*, 657 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1982); *People v. Franco*, 698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985); *People v. Coca*, 732 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).

